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There is an alarming indication that increasing attention in the

I

Pentagon is being directed toward removing basic roles and missions of
the Armed Services from existing statute a..nd making them subject only
to executive determination.
Such a move is being advocated under the guise of "strengthening"
the Secretary of Defense and "streamlining" the Defense Department. This
may strengthen the executive agency. But it will weaken legislative authority
and status in an area in which Congress has wisely and resolutely insisted
on the exercise of its prerogative and responsibility since the founding of
our country.
What are these "roles and missions"? Briefly these constitute the
specific provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, amended, which
set forth the fundamental and basic roles and missions of each of the Armed
Services. In a sense these provisions of law constitute a charter for each
armed service, a kind of directive from Congress stating the purpose for
which Congress, in accordance with its constitutional responsibility, creates,
provides for, and maintains each of the armed services.
It must be clearly understood that the statutory prescription of roles

and missions is not a detailed statement of the specific day-to-day jobs,
weapons, techniques, research projects and routine activities. Rather,
roles and missions in law are stated in broad, flexible and elastic terms,
which do not make this statutory assignment of roles and missions a straightjacket, a restriction, or an impediment to scientific and technological
progress.

I doubt if anyone today could prescribe in more fundamental and more
flexible terms the roles and missions of the armed services as they were
written into the National Security Act of 1947 with its subsequent amendment.
It must be clearly understood that the roles and missions of the

National Security Act are separate and distinct from the detailed assignment of "functions" of the Armed Services. The functions of the Armed
Services are the details of the jobs and duties of the Armed Services, stated
in more specific terms than exists in law. Essentially, the functions, which
are prescribed by the executive authority of the President or the Secretary
of Defense, are adjustable from time to time to new techniques, new weapons,
new scientific discoveries. Such functions are amplifications of the basic
roles and missions prescribed by law.
So, in the combination of the wording of the roles and missions in
the National Security Act as written by Congress and the detailed, adjustable
assignment of specific functions by the executive, there is a completely
proper, workable, and successful device by which the legislative and the
executive can exercise appropriate authority with respect to what the Armed
Services are to do.
This matter of statutory prescriptions of roles and missions is no
new issue. In fact, it was probably the fundamental issue connected with
the National Security Act of 1947. It certainly received more attention
from Congress in its consideration of that bill than any other feature of
that law.
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I would like to briefly review some of the pertinent facts in connection with the inclusion of roles and missions in the National Security Act of
1947, as amended.
As originally proposed, the National Security Act of 1947 did not
include the statutory outline of roles and missions. Rather, it was proposed
that an executive order on roles and missions would be issued upon passage
of the security act. However, Congress, in its wisdom, decided that it was
not only the right of Congress to prescribe basic roles and missions for the
Armed Services but it was an inescapable responsibility of Congress to so do.
Such an attitude on the part of Congress was not readily accepted by the executive sponsors of the proposed national security act. Rowena,, Congress was
resolute in its position and set forth in properly worded provisions the fundamental roles and missions of each of the Armed Services.
I would like to point out that Congress, alert to the practical realities
of defense matters, recognized that two elements of the Armed Services were
in jeopardy. Because they considered those elements to be necessary to the
attainment of a properly balanced defense organization and because such jeopardy should not be permitted to continue, Congress was more precise in the
prescription of roles and missions for naval aviation and the Marine Corps.
Congress reaffirmed in even more emphatic terms, through Public
Law 416, 82d Congress, 2d Session, its insistence upon a continued maintenance of a combat ready Marine Corps as a national force in readiness.
Congress underlined its attitude and determination in this respect by stating
that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should have coequal status with
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'
, 'Other members of the JCS in consideration of all matters pertaining to the

Marine Corps and that, among other provisions, the Marine Corps should be
maintained at a strength of three combat divisions and three air wings.
It was perfectly obvious at that time that powerful factions within

the Armed Services bitterly opposed this Congressional decision.
There is not the slightest doubt in my mind but what the Marine Corps
will be destroyed as a combat force in readiness if present effort:l'to remove
II~

roles and missions from the law ill successful.

There is no place for the

~M'

Marine Corps as it 1W developed, as Congress wants it, and as the country
needs it, in the master plan of those who wish to centralize all military
authority under somebody in the Pentagon.
It is just as certain that our balanced naval power, with its unsurpassed naval aviation, as well as its Marine landing forces, will be destroyed
if the roles and missions are removed from statute. We will find the United
States, which is in fact an island natiorx dependent upon maritime power for
economic and military survival, possessing a Navy which no longer will contain the unique American attribute of sea power -- the balanced fleet.
This effort -- and it is a persistent one -- to remove roles and missions from law is not only a matter of military importance. It is of basic
constitutional importance which is impossible to over- emphasize in matters
of legislative - executive relationship. In a practical sense the statutory
prescription of roles and missions is one of the few meaningful instruments
by which Congress can discharge its proper responsibility with respect to
defense policy. If roles and missions fur the Armed Services, as now pre
scribed by law, are removed from existing statute and made subject to
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executive whim, little will remain for Congress to do except appropriate
monies for the Pentagon.
This effort, which is gaining momentum within the Pentagon today,
is one of the most fundamental issues of our times . Congress could not,
and I predict will not, look lightly or casually upon attempts to divest Congress of its authority and its responsibility to prescribe these basic roles
and missions.

Those persons who have, since 1947, refused to accept the

decision of Congress to include roles and missions in the National Security
Act must not be permitted to succeed with their efforts to undo this Congressional decision.
There has not, in recent years, been a more clearcut manifestation
of a Congressional mandate in defense policies than the Congressional determination to prescribe roles and missions rather than leave it to the executive.
I don 1t believe that Congress will permit this Pentagon power play to
succeed. I do not believe that Congress and the American people will ever
permit the Pentagon to erase the statutory safeguards that assures a continued
existence of the Marines as an ever- ready combat force.
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There has been much talk about the debilitating effects of
inter-service rivalries.

I would point out that while service rivalries

-

have caused friction and waste, that rivalry in this sense should not be
confused with service competition .

Service competition has done much

to uphold the morale of the services, and it has undoubtedly saved the
country lives and dollars.

There is a need for continued healthy

service competition, but the lines should be drawn sharply so that honest,
worthwhile endeavors to excel will not be compounded by efforts to
eradicate and to place one service paramount to the others.
I think there is much to be said in behalf of the continuation
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because, as a result of this, we have the
best judgment of the combined thinking of the best men in all the services.
If the joint chiefs of staff concept was to be done away with, it would mean

that the alternative would be the creation of a single chief of staff or
principal military advisor to the President who would, on the basis of his
. single judgment as against the collective judgment of the joint chiefs of
staff at the present time, be empowered to make decisions in behalf of
the security of this country .

This kind of substitution -this one-man

judgment - should be avoided as much as possible.

I think that, far

better than breaking up the present system we have at this time, it would
be in the interests of the nation and our security to bring about a
reorganization within the Pentagon itself.
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Parkinson's Law - the multiple additions to a civilian
bureaucracy - is a classic illustration of what is happening in the
Pentagon.

It is my understanding that there are in excess of 30 assistant

secretaries or their equivalent in the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the
Air Force.

These assistant secretaries have their assistants, and in

addition to these there are numerous commissions and committees.
Many of these civilians in the Pentagon can and do give directives to the
military personnel stationed there, and they do so while the responsibility rests not with them but with the officers to whom they issue o r ders.
The question of the coupling of authority with responsibility in the
Pentagon is one which the Armed Services Committees of the Congress
ought to investigate and make recommendations to correct.

There are

too many political appointees in the Pentagon who know too little about
matters military.

There are too many of these appointees who stay for

too short a while, learn too little, and who accomplish little except to
add to the disorder already prevalent throughout that building.

Too many

of these temporary civilian administrators try to formulate policy in all
fields of defense and very likely too many of them, all too often, interfere
when they should be minding their own business.
In my opinion, it would be a good thing if the Armed Services
Committee would look into the question of the chain of command and find
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out, for example, just how many steps there are between the individual
joint chiefs of staff and-the- ehai;wau o£ tee--;ohtt chiefs and the President
of the United States or, for that matter, the Secretary of Defense.

We

find, for example, that in the New York Times of February 6, 1958, an
article by Hanson W. Baldwin states that General Maxwell D. Taylor,
Army Chief of Staff last September, said, "There are 19 civilian officials
between the Army Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief who either
command, control or influence his /the Chief of Staff's 7 conduct of the
business of the Army."
The civilian bureaucracy which has grown up in the Depart~1.1-v~.l'

ment of Defense should be :Nwestigated.

It is not a small policy-forming

group superimposed on the separate services as was originally contemplated.

It now numbers thousands of employees who do not confine them-

selves to policy, but who duplicate and confuse the work done by the
individual services and who delve deeply into administration, operations
and even command.

It is time to streamline the Defense Department.

It is time to take a look-see at this swollen civilian bureaucracy, and

it is time to reduce the number of assistant secretaries and assistants
to the assistant secretaries. It is time to find out what the numerous
commissions and committees have been doing, and if they have been
doing nothing, it is time to abolish them.

It is time for a housecleaning

not to the end that the Pentagon must be made an example of, but to the
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end that greater efficiency, better organization and greater stability
~- ,_:,
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the m.ili-ta.p.y can be established.

It is time to do away with the

political appointee and to put in his place the dedicated public servant.
It is time to recognize that the Defense establishment in its proper
sphere can and does make a contribution to our democracy.

It is time

to restore greater respect among and between the services, and it is
N-~ ~,. ~-4--~~
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time to give to our military leader7/{he functions which are supposedly
nbes:x theirs under the laws of the land.

